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Much research has demonstrated that aging is marked by decreased source memory
relative to young adults, yet a smaller body of work has demonstrated that increasing
the socioemotional content of source information may be one way to reduce age-related
performance differences. Although dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (dmPFC) activity may
support source memory among young and older adults, the extent to which one
activates dorsal vs. ventral mPFC may reflect one’s personal connection with incoming
information. Because truth value may be one salient marker that impacts one’s connection
with information and allocation of attention toward incoming material, we investigated
whether the perceived truth value of information differently impacts differences in mPFC
activity associated with encoding source information, particularly with age. Twelve young
(18–23 years) and 12 older adults (63–80 years) encoded true and false statements.
Behavioral results showed similar memory performance between the age groups. With
respect to neural activity associated with subsequent memory, young adults, relative to
older adults, exhibited greater activity in dmPFC while older adults displayed enhanced
ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) and insula engagement relative to young. These
results may potentially indicate that young adults focus on a general knowledge acquisition
goal, while older adults focus on emotionally relevant aspects of the material. The
findings demonstrate that age-related differences in recruitment of mPFC associated
with encoding source information may in some circumstances underlie age-equivalent
behavioral performance.
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INTRODUCTION
In addition to remembering the information itself, some of the
most important choices in life require consideration of the con-
text related to incoming information, often referred to as source
memory (Johnson and Raye, 1981; Johnson et al., 1993). For
example, the reliability of a source may be crucial when evaluat-
ing health claims (e.g., should you believe an endorsement that a
dietary supplement can increase longevity if the endorser helped
develop the supplement?). A small body of behavioral evidence
shows that increasing task salience, or the degree of importance
of a task to an individual, may reduce age differences in source
memory (e.g., Rahhal et al., 2002; but see Siedlecki et al., 2005), in
contrast with the age-related source memory impairments shown
for tasks across several domains of stimuli that utilize less salient
(e.g., focusing on perceptual information, as in Rahhal et al.,
2002) and non-social material (e.g., Spencer and Raz, 1995). This
suggests that for salient information (e.g., using affective or value-
based information, as in Rahhal et al., 2002), older adults may not
show the same pattern of age-related impairment that is typically
found in tasks involving less salient information.
Purported truth might be one salient factor driving prioriti-
zation of information at encoding, and may reduce age differ-
ences in source memory, given the inherent value of knowing
whether information is true. For instance, while both theNational
Enquirer and The New York Times are sources of information,
people may perceive non-tabloid journalism as more truth-
ful, and more deeply encode this information. These decisions
occur in the interpersonal realm as well. You might, for exam-
ple, learn the same piece of information from a gossiping co-
worker known to spread rumors, or from a trusted friend; you
may allocate more attention to your friend due to the per-
ceived reliability of that source. This prioritization in encod-
ing strategies suggests that source memory, or remembering
the context in which information was presented, may directly
relate to how we process information obtained from our daily
interactions.
It is possible that the neural activity supporting age-equivalent
source memory for socially salient material involves the interac-
tion of cortical systems with the medial temporal lobe (MTL)
that are distinct from the cortical-MTL interactions underlying
non-social sources, which undergo age-related decline. Processing
socially meaningful vs. non-social information recruits a reliable
network of brain regions (Mitchell et al., 2002, 2005), and the
engagement of medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) in particular
has been documented in a range of tasks involving socioemo-
tional processing (Van Overwalle, 2009), including memory for
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information encoded during a social vs. a non-social orienting
task (e.g., Mitchell et al., 2004).
Work exploring potential age differences in mPFC function
during social tasks shows evidence for equivalent engagement
for young and older adults (Gutchess et al., 2007; Beadle et al.,
2012; Cassidy et al., 2012) as well as evidence for decreased activ-
ity with age (Moran et al., 2012). The diverging patterns of age
effects on dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (dmPFC), however, may
reflect when information is personally salient (Beadle et al., 2012;
Cassidy et al., 2012) vs. when it is not (Moran et al., 2012). For
instance, for the socially salient task involving self-referencing,
young and older adults similarly recruit dmPFC for the processing
of self- vs. other-related information (Gutchess et al., 2007) and
for successful encoding of source materials presented in a self-
vs. other-referential way (Leshikar and Duarte, 2013). However,
older adults may not activate dmPFC to the level of young (e.g.,
Moran et al., 2012) unless a task explicitly involves socially and
personally salient information.
Age-equivalent mPFC activity in personally salient social tasks
may be concordant with behavioral data showing that socioe-
motional or value-rich materials reduce age-related performance
differences (Fung and Carstensen, 2003; Carstensen and Mikels,
2005; Mather and Carstensen, 2005; May et al., 2005; Cassidy and
Gutchess, 2012). Because older adults place higher priorities than
young adults on value-rich, affective information (Fredrickson
and Carstensen, 1990), they may perform as well as young adults
on source memory tasks with value-rich material. For instance,
although young adults recall perceptual and conceptual source
information better than older adults, this age difference disap-
pears when using sources relevant to emotional information (May
et al., 2005) or truth value (Rahhal et al., 2002).
Recruitment of dmPFC for social tasks may also depend on
one’s orientation to the task, regardless of age. For instance, young
adults show a dissociation in mPFC activity when thinking about
similar or dissimilar others, such that dmPFC is engaged when
abstractly thinking about a dissimilar other, while ventromedial
prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) is recruited for thinking about self-
similar others and emotional states (Mitchell et al., 2006a). This
raises the possibility that age differences in mPFC activity may in
part be due to differences in how young and older adults naturally
orient to social tasks (e.g., they approach the learning of social
information in an abstract way largely devoid of personal involve-
ment, or with more of an emotional orientation). Supporting
the idea of task orientation influencing mPFC activity, recent
work has demonstrated that age differences in mPFC engagement
toward processing valenced social material are driven by dmPFC
in young adults, and by vmPFC in older adults (Cassidy et al.,
2013). It is unknown, however, whether young and older adults
display overall differences in neural activity, and specifically dis-
sociations in dorsal and ventral mPFC activity, for salient tasks
that are not overtly positive or negative.
A tendency to focus on value-rich and emotional information
with age is reflective of Socioemotional Selectivity Theory, which
posits that older adults tend to focus on processing information
with enhanced value and socioemotional meaning due to the feel-
ing that time in one’s life is limited (Carstensen et al., 1999). In
contrast, young adults are proposed to have a more general focus
on acquiring knowledge. Illustrating this concept, older adults
have been shown to remember more advertisements featuring
emotionally meaningful messages, whereas young adults do not
display a bias based on the type of presented material (Fung and
Carstensen, 2003). If older adults approach tasks involving value-
rich stimuli with an emotional orientation, then more vmPFC
activity rather than dmPFC activity might be expected in older
vs. young for such tasks. This is because ventral subregions of
mPFC have been implicated in affective processing (Davidson
and Irwin, 1999), including subsequent memory for emotional
material (Dolcos et al., 2004), and for affective components,
as opposed to cognitive components, in theory of mind tasks
(Shamay-Tsoory and Aharon-Peretz, 2007). In contrast, dmPFC
has been implicated in more complex cognitive operations (e.g.,
see Saxe, 2006).
Another distinction in dorsal and ventral mPFC activ-
ity involves the extent of their engagement during controlled
and automatic processing tasks (Satpute and Lieberman, 2006;
Lieberman, 2007). For instance, automatic processing has been
likened to reflexive processing and with vmPFC activity during
the formation of intuitions (Bechara et al., 1997). In contrast,
controlled processing has been likened to reflective process-
ing, and has been linked with increased dmPFC activity when
using reappraisal to reduce emotional response to negative scenes
(Ochsner et al., 2002). Older adults have larger memory deficits
on tasks involving controlled processing, relative to automatic
processing (Hasher and Zacks, 1979), perhaps because many
tasks do not motivate older adults to access controlled process-
ing resources (Germain and Hess, 2007). When motivated by
socioemotional goals, however, older adults may be more likely
to allocate the cognitive resources necessary for controlled pro-
cessing toward their goal, as in the case of emotion regulation
(Carstensen et al., 2003). Thus, in the case of a context where
information is value-rich, but the task itself is not necessarily
emotionally meaningful, we might expect young, but not older,
adults to use controlled processing to encode information even
if they are not instructed to do so, in the service of knowledge
acquisition goals. In contrast, older adults may employ automatic
processing during similar tasks. For a task involving value-rich
stimuli, this might be reflected in enhanced vmPFC activity
among older adults relative to young adults.
The present study explored whether young and older adults
differentially engage dmPFC and vmPFC for the value-rich task of
encoding truth value, be it inferred from a social source or explic-
itly stated. Our task involved learning the purported truth value
of health-related statements, which provides a unique opportu-
nity to appeal to the processing strategies of both young and
older adults. Because health-related statements may hold partic-
ular importance for older adults, age differences in behavioral
source memory for truth value may be reduced compared to the
typical finding of deficits with age. Given previous findings of age
differences in dmPFC and vmPFC activity as a function of the
content of incoming salient information (Leclerc and Kensinger,
2008, 2010; Cassidy et al., 2013), we expected that young adults
would show enhanced dmPFC activity relative to older adults
for subsequent memory based on the idea that learning true and
false statements might signal an inherent knowledge acquisition
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focus in the young. In contrast, we expected that older adults
would exhibit increased vmPFC activity relative to young adults
for subsequent memory, given that the more value-based aspects
of health-related statements to older adults may make themmore
likely to approach the task with a socioemotional orientation.
Given a potential socioemotional orientation among older adults,
the insula, due to its broad role in emotional processing, was
another neural region where increased activity might be expected
in older vs. young adults for the encoding of truth value (Adolphs
et al., 2000; Phan et al., 2002; Sanfey et al., 2003; Barrett et al.,
2004; Craig, 2009; Wiech et al., 2010; Zaki et al., 2012). Insofar
as the insula is engaged when making decisions in an emotional
context (Sanfey et al., 2003), greater insula recruitment might be
expected among individuals who orient to material in an emo-
tional way (e.g., older adults) relative to those less likely to do so
(e.g., young adults).
METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
Twelve right-handed University of Michigan students (18–23
years old, M = 20.5, SD = 1.2, 58% female) and twelve right-
handed community dwelling older adults (63–80 years old, M =
71.1, SD = 5.5, 66% female) were recruited for the study. Older
adults were screened for abnormal orientation scores (<27) using
the Mini-Mental State Examination (M = 28.7, SD = 1.1), and
had marginally more years of education (M = 15.4 years, SD =
2.7) than young adults (M = 13.6 years, SD = 1.7), t(22) = 1.95,
p = 0.06. To ensure the samples’ comparability with those in
the prior literature, participants completed a vocabulary measure
(Shipley, 1986), digit and pattern comparison tasks (Salthouse
and Babcock, 1991), forward and backward digit span mea-
sures (Wechsler, 1981), and a letter-number sequencing measure
(Wechsler, 1997). Results are summarized in Table 1. Participants
reported no history of psychiatric or neurological disorders and
no history of drug or alcohol abuse at the time of testing.
The University of Michigan Institutional Review Board approved
the study, and written informed consent was obtained from all
participants.
STIMULI
The stimuli consisted of 240 true statements regarding health-
related information for which participants were unlikely to
have prior knowledge (e.g., “Women’s hearts beat faster than
men’s”). Altering words in each true statement created fac-
tually untrue statements (e.g., “Men blink nearly twice as
Table 1 | Means (SD) for cognitive measures.
Measure Young Older t p-value
adults adults
Shipley vocabulary 31.1 (3.6) 37.3 (2.9) −4.37 <0.001
Digit comparison 28.6 (2.8) 22.2 (4.0) 4.10 0.001
Pattern comparison 24.2 (2.3) 16.2 (4.7) 4.70 <0.001
Forward digit span 8.2 (1.3) 7.9 (1.2) 0.55 0.60
Backward digit span 6.4 (1.1) 5.8 (1.7) 0.78 0.45
Letter-number sequencing 5.4 (1.0) 5.1 (0.9) 0.86 0.40
much as women”). After creating a factually untrue version
of each statement, each statement was randomly assigned to
one of two sets (Set A and Set B). For half of the partic-
ipants, Set A consisted of true versions and Set B of false.
For the other half of participants, Set A consisted of false ver-
sions and Set B of true. Thus, whether each participant saw
a true or false version of any given statement was fully coun-
terbalanced across participants. The order of statements from
each set was randomly drawn for each participant. These state-
ments have been used in prior aging research (Skurnik et al.,
2005) and are available upon request. All stimuli were pro-
grammed and presented using E-Prime software (Psychological
Software Tools, Pittsburgh, PA) and IFIS 9.0 (MRI Devices,
Waukesha, WI).
TRUTH JUDGMENT TASK
Participants were told they would see statements coupled with an
indication of truth value, and would later be asked to remember
if each statement was true or false. The task comprised a 2 (Truth
Value: True/False) × 2 (Source Type: Inferred/Stated) design, in
which source memory for different types of information was
compared across age groups. Some statements were stated to be
true or false (stated: “TRUE” or “FALSE”), without referencing a
social source. Other statements were inferred to be true or false,
based on the source (inferred: “PAT says:” or “CHRIS says:”).
Prior to encoding, participants were introduced to two hypo-
thetical individuals, Pat and Chris. One individual was described
as being honest and trustworthy, and participants were told to
assume that every statement obtained from this person was true.
The other individual was described as very dishonest and untrust-
worthy, and participants were told to assume this person only
made false statements. Half of the statements were true and the
other half false, and each of these were randomly assigned to
each participant for the corresponding inferred or stated source.
Participants practiced the task and received feedback on their
responses before completing the full encoding task in the scanner.
Statements and truth value indications were presented on the
screen concurrently for 6 s (see Figure 1). Participants selected
whether presented information was true or false via button
press. Responses were monitored during scanning to ensure that
participants were accurately reporting the truth status of state-
ments. No participant exhibited difficulty with this aspect of the
task. Each run contained 60 statements, pseudorandomly dis-
tributed among baseline periods of fixation ranging from 2 to
12 s. Condition order and baseline periods were determined using
Optseq2 (http://surfer.nmr.mgh.harvard.edu/optseq).
Participants completed the source memory task outside the
scanner approximately 15–20min after structural scans and four
encoding runs. Participants were reminded of the truth values
associated with each person (e.g., “If you remember that Pat
said it, it must be true; if Chris said it, it must be false.”), were
informed that they had seen all statements previously in the scan-
ner, and were told that half the statements were true and half
false. During the source memory task, participants saw each of
the 240 statements displayed during encoding, with no indication
of truth value. Participants indicated whether they were confi-
dent a statement was true, guessing that it was true, guessing
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FIGURE 1 | Examples of encoding stimuli used in each condition.
it was false, or confident it was false, via a four-choice button
press.
IMAGE ACQUISITION
Data were acquired using a 3T GE LX MR scanner (GE Signa
9.0 VH3 software, General Electric, Milwaukee, WI) paired with
a whole-head coil. Two hundred and seventy volumes were
obtained in each of four functional runs, using a gradient-
echo spiral acquisition sequence to measure blood oxygen level-
dependent (BOLD) effects (TR = 2000ms, TE = 25ms, flip
angle = 80, 64× 64 matrix, FOV = 200mm). Dummy scans
were also acquired, but discarded for analyses. Thirty-two con-
tiguous oblique slices were acquired parallel to the AC/PC line.
T1 Structural images were acquired using a Spoiled GRASS
sequence (FOV= 24mm, 256× 192matrix), of 120 sagittal slices
(0.9373mm in-plane resolution) of 1.5mm thickness.
DATA ANALYSIS
Behavioral data
Behavioral data were analyzed using an alpha level of 0.05.
Responses to a statement involving a confident correct truth
value attribution were classified as correct source memory for
that statement. Guessing responses and incorrect attributions
were classified as incorrect source memory for that statement, in
keeping with prior research (Otten et al., 2001).
fMRI data
Functional volumes were slice time corrected with an 8-point
Hanning windowed sinc interpolation implemented in C++.
Subject motion correction was performed using AIR 3.08 (Woods
et al., 1992). Remaining analyses were performed using SPM2
(Wellcome Department of Cognitive Neurology, London, UK)
and programs from the Gablab Toolbox (Massachusetts Institute
of Technology, Cambridge, MA). The anatomical image was
coregistered to the fifth functional volume and normalized to
MNI space using a standard T1 template image with 2mm3
voxels. Normalization parameters determined from the anatomy
were applied to functional volumes, which were then smoothed
with a 6mm isotropic Gaussian kernel. Effects for the eight stimu-
lus conditions [i.e., 2 (Truth Value: True/False)× 2 (Source Type:
Inferred/Stated) × 2 (Subsequent Memory: Correct/Incorrect)]
were estimated using event-related regressors convolved with a
canonical hemodynamic response function.
Results reported are from group-level, random effects analy-
ses using an uncorrected threshold of p = 0.005 with a cluster
size of k > 11, chosen to ensure that activations spanned at least
two acquired contiguous voxels. Although we used a fairly lib-
eral threshold, we took a whole-brain rather than a region of
interest approach because relatively little prior work on this topic
made it desirable to test a wider array of regions showing age-
related changes in subsequent source memory in order to inform
future work. Functional images from encoding were back-sorted
for further analyses according to whether truth value was subse-
quently remembered (correct: high confidence correct responses
only) or forgotten (incorrect: summing across guess responses
and confident incorrect attributions). Subsequent memory con-
trasts (young > old, correct > incorrect source memory; old >
young, correct> incorrect source memory) were used to initially
analyze functional data and to identify regions demonstrating
age differences where correct source memory produced increased
engagement over incorrect source memory. The correct > incor-
rect source memory contrast was defined at the subject-level
individually, and then entered in a group-level analysis for simple
one-way group-wise differences. Locations of peak activation on
the cortical surface were identified using SPM2, and Brodmann
areas were obtained with MRIcron (Rorden and Brett, 2000). To
characterize age differences in subsequent source memory from
our whole-brain analysis, parameter estimates for each condition
from each participant were extracted from the peak voxels of our
a priori regions of interest (dmPFC, vmPFC, and insula) where
significant activations emerged in the correct > incorrect source
memory contrast.
RESULTS
BEHAVIORAL RESULTS
Proportions of recognition responses in each category (con-
fident true, guessing true, guessing false, confident false) are
shown in Table 2. From these responses, two behavioral mea-
sures were computed to assess memory performance. First, the
proportion of correct source memory judgments (confident cor-
rect attributions; e.g., confident true when the statement was
true) was calculated. Second, the false alarm rate was cal-
culated as the proportion of statements incorrectly assigned
a confident attribution (e.g., confident true when the state-
ment was false). We analyzed these measures separately as
dependent variables using a 2 (Age Group: young, old) × 2
(Source Type: inferred, stated) × 2 (Truth Value: true, false)
mixed ANOVA.
For correct source memory judgments, there was a main
effect of Truth Value, F(1, 22) = 45.84, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.68,
such that participants correctly identified more true (M = 0.71,
SD = 0.18) than false (M = 0.53, SD = 0.20) statements. There
were no main effects of Age Group or Source Type. There was
also a significant interaction between Source Type and Truth
Value, F(1, 22) = 9.42, p < 0.01, η2p = 0.30. Contrasts showed
that true statements coming from a stated source (M = 0.73,
SD = 0.19) were better remembered than true statements com-
ing from a inferred source (M = 0.68, SD = 0.17), F(1, 22) =
7.69, p < 0.01, η2p = 0.26. In contrast, accuracy in identifying
false statements from inferred (M = 0.54, SD = 0.20) and stated
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Table 2 | Behavioral source memory performance [M, (SD)] for young (YA) and older (OA) adults.
Confident true Guessing true Guessing false Confident false
True False True False True False True False
SOCIAL SOURCE
YA 0.70 (0.19) 0.13 (0.06) 0.15 (0.14) 0.12 (0.11) 0.10 (0.06) 0.19 (0.09) 0.06 (0.03) 0.56 (0.16)
OA 0.67 (0.16) 0.13 (0.10) 0.15 (0.12) 0.12 (0.11) 0.09 (0.06) 0.21 (0.14) 0.09 (0.07) 0.53 (0.25)
NON-SOCIAL SOURCE
YA 0.73 (0.22) 0.13 (0.08) 0.14 (0.12) 0.14 (0.11) 0.07 (0.09) 0.20 (0.13) 0.06 (0.07) 0.54 (0.18)
OA 0.73 (0.16) 0.15 (0.12) 0.13 (0.11) 0.13 (0.11) 0.08 (0.05) 0.23 (0.12) 0.06 (0.06) 0.50 (0.22)
Correct source memory is the same as confident responses for the correct truth value (e.g., confident true for true statements). Incorrect source memory is the
sum of guessing (true and false) and confident incorrect source attributions. No age group differences were significant in any condition.
(M = 0.52, SD = 0.20) sources did not differ, F(1, 22) = 1.33, p =
0.26, η2p = 0.06. No other interactions approached significance.
For false alarm rates, there was a main effect of Truth Value,
F(1, 22) = 15.46, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.41. Participants were more
likely to confidently remember an originally false statement as
true than an originally true statement as false. No other effects
approached significance.
The absence of behavioral interactions involving Source Type
and Age Group suggests that source memory in aging does
not depend on whether information was inferred via a per-
son’s reliability or explicitly stated. However, prior fMRI results
have suggested that social information processing is neurally dis-
tinct from processing other types of information (Mitchell et al.,
2002, 2004; Van Overwalle, 2009). We accordingly characterized
our imaging data to determine if the processing mechanisms
involved in encoding inferred vs. stated truth value were similarly
distinct, and how aging might modulate the engagement of these
regions.
fMRI RESULTS
We identified brain regions showing age differences in response
to overall subsequent memory, given the relatively low number of
participants in this study (Ns= 12 for each age group) (correct>
incorrect memory; see Table 3). This contrast captures regions
that differ across age groups, but is conservative with respect
to the source and truth of each statement. Parameter estimates
from the peak voxel of these functionally defined regions were
probed to characterize whether age differences in activity was
driven by Source Type or Truth Value (Figure 1). However, spe-
cific contrasts involving these factors were not conducted due
to low power and the lack of behavioral evidence for source
memory differences with age depending on Source Type or
Truth Value.
In a whole-brain analysis, this subsequent memory contrast
yielded brain regions contributing to age differences in cor-
rect subsequent memory for source (Table 2). To probe the
expected age differences related to socioemotional processing in
the dmPFC, vmPFC, and insula, we focused on these regions.
Parameter estimates of activation attributable to each condition
were then extracted and compared in 2 (Age Group: young,
old) × 2 (Source Type: inferred, stated) × 2 (Truth Value: true,
false) mixed ANOVAs.
As defined by the contrast, young adults had increased acti-
vation compared to older adults in two regions of left dmPFC
[Figure 2A; BA 6: F(1, 22) = 9.43, p < 0.01, η2p = 0.30; BA 8:
F(1, 22) = 16.48, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.43]. Characterizing this effect
further (and probing effects unrelated to the region-defining con-
trast), there were marginal Age Group by Truth Value interactions
in both regions of dmPFC [BA 6: F(1, 22) = 3.01, p = 0.097, η2p =
0.12; BA 8: F(1, 22) = 3.43, p = 0.08, η2p = 0.14]. Pairwise com-
parisons showed that in both dmPFC regions, this interaction
appeared to be driven by enhanced activity in young relative to
older adults when successfully encoding true (BA6: p = 0.002,
BA 8: p = 0.004) vs. false (BA 6: p = 0.40, BA 8: p = 0.70)
statements.
As defined by the contrast, older adults had increased vmPFC
engagement compared to young adults in a region of left vmPFC
[Figure 2B; F(1, 22) = 3.43, p = 0.002, η2p = 0.35]. Examination
of parameter estimates for effects unrelated to the region-defining
contrast showed that unlike the marginal Age Group by Truth
Value interactions in dmPFC activity, vmPFC showed a marginal
Age Group by Source Type interaction, F(1, 22) = 3.46, p = 0.08,
η2p = 0.14. Young adults engaged vmPFC more for the successful
encoding of truth value from stated vs. socially-inferred sources,
F(1, 11) = 4.35, p = 0.06, η2p = 0.28, while older adults, showed
no such difference, F < 1, p = 0.93. There was also a marginal
main effect of Source Type, such that all participants tended to
recruit vmPFC for the successful encoding of stated vs. inferred
truth value, F(1, 22) = 3.11, p = 0.09, η2p = 0.12. Finally, older
adults had increased neural activity relative to young adults (as
defined by the contrast) in the right insula (Figure 2C), F(1, 22) =
9.55, p < 0.01, η2p = 0.30, for the successful encoding of truth
value. Unlike the marginal Truth Value by Age Group interactions
in dmPFC and Source Type by Age Group interaction exhibited
in vmPFC during the task, no interactions were present in insula
recruitment.
DISCUSSION
Previous research on source memory and aging has detailed
decreases in older adults’ behavioral performance (Chalfonte
and Johnson, 1996), and neural activity (Mitchell et al., 2006b;
Dennis et al., 2008) when compared to a young cohort, indi-
cating overall age-related decline in encoding source informa-
tion. However, a smaller body of behavioral work suggests that
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Table 3 | Age differences in brain activity for correct > incorrect source memory.
Region BA k Activation Peak (x, y, z) t
(A) YOUNG > OLD, CORRECT > INCORRECT SOURCE MEMORY
L dorsomedial prefrontal cortex 6/8 68 −14 32 54 5.70
L dorsomedial prefrontal cortex 6 33 −14 12 66 3.60
R amygdala 28 20 −2 −24 3.87
R superior frontal gyrus 6 14 14 −16 78 3.52
L precuneus 19 15 −30 −72 32 3.25
L inferior frontal gyrus 9 14 −52 20 24 3.08
(B) OLD > YOUNG, CORRECT > INCORRECT SOURCE MEMORY
L ventromedial prefrontal cortex 10/11 66 −16 56 −2 4.01
L medial prefrontal cortex 10 −8 52 −4 3.16
L anterior cingulate gyrus 32 −14 46 −4 3.08
R insula 37 44 −6 −2 3.26
R precuneus 7 224 16 −66 52 5.81
L dorsolateral prefrontal cortex 9/46 75 −40 36 36 5.36
L middle frontal gyrus 46 −46 36 24 4.10
L precentral gyrus 4 50 −52 −16 28 4.69
R middle frontal gyrus 8 180 26 36 40 4.69
R cingulate gyrus 32 18 22 36 3.43
L cingulate gyrus 31 25 −20 −28 40 4.48
L insula 12 −28 −22 24 4.08
R inferior parietal lobule 40 64 68 −26 26 3.77
R superior parietal lobe 5 40 20 −52 58 3.66
R thalamus 19 10 −38 10 3.59
R middle frontal gyrus 6 13 26 4 42 3.58
L inferior parietal lobule 40 20 −34 −42 48 3.57
R inferior frontal gyrus 47 27 36 36 2 3.56
L superior parietal lobule 5 12 −22 −46 68 3.53
R posterior cingulate gyrus 29 18 6 −50 4 3.53
R superior frontal gyrus 6 20 8 −10 70 3.52
R insula 15 38 22 6 3.45
R inferior temporal gyrus 20 24 50 −34 −14 3.41
R fusiform gyrus 37 12 −12 58 20 3.26
L postcentral gyrus 40 15 −54 −22 14 3.26
R middle frontal gyrus 10 28 32 56 22 3.24
R superior frontal gyrus 10 22 62 24 3.05
R superior frontal gyrus 9 11 10 56 30 3.06
The data show regions emerging in the contrast with an overall threshold of p < 0.005 and an extent threshold of 11 voxels. Regions listed without a cluster size
are subsumed by the larger cluster listed directly above. A priori regions of interest are listed first. Other regions are listed from highest to lowest t-value. L, Left; R,
right; k, cluster size.
increasing the salience of stimuli can reduce age-related source
memory impairments (Rahhal et al., 2002; May et al., 2005), and
that older adults’ memory may be enhanced when information is
initially encoded in a salient way (Cassidy and Gutchess, 2012).
The current study extended this idea by asking if the value-rich
task of encoding truth value would be represented by differen-
tial activation of mPFC with age, despite potential age-equivalent
memory performance. If young adults rely more on knowl-
edge acquisition goals when learning salient information, greater
activity in dorsalmPFC would be expected, whereas greater activ-
ity in ventral mPFC and in the insula would be expected for
older adults, representing an approach to the task that reflects
more socioemotional processing. Our findings are consistent with
these expectations, suggesting that in these circumstances, age-
equivalent performance may be supported by differential neural
recruitment.
The demonstrated dorsal-ventral shift in encoding-related
activity with age could also be reflective of overall changes in
processing focus, as posited by Socioemotional Selectivity Theory
(Carstensen et al., 1999). This theory puts forth the idea that with
increasing age, people shift from a focus on acquiring knowl-
edge to a focus on enhancing the emotional meaning in one’s
life. Thus, a changing focus in older adults toward material with
enhanced emotional meaning might be reflected in enhanced
activity in regions supporting affective processing (i.e., vmPFC)
relative to young. In contrast, regions implicated in the encoding
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FIGURE 2 | Age differences for correct—incorrect sourcememory for truth
value existed inmPFC, such that young adults had enhanced activity over
older adults in two regions of left dmPFC (A), while older adults had
increased recruitment over young in left vmPFC (B).Older adults also had
enhanced activity relative to young adults for subsequent memory of truth
value in the right insula (C). Error bars represent standard error of the mean.
of value-rich information (i.e., dmPFC) may be more active in
young than older adults, as young adults may try to optimize their
likelihood of acquiring knowledge.
The current findings revealed enhanced overall dmPFC activ-
ity in young relative to older adults. While older adults have
shown dmPFC activity similar to young adults during socially
self-relevant processing (Gutchess et al., 2007; Beadle et al., 2012;
Cassidy et al., 2012), age-related decreases have been observed
in tasks involving social, but not-explicitly self-related, mate-
rial (Moran et al., 2012). Given that the current task did not
place older adults within such a social task, we might not expect
them to activate dmPFC to the same extent as young. Increased
dmPFC processing among young compared to older adults may
also indicate the use of relatively more controlled processing to
encode information. Additional research is needed to clarify this
possibility.
Exploratory analyses provided further insight into whether
stated or inferred truth value, or the truth value of information
itself, drove age differences in dmPFC activity. An exploratory
characterization of the greater activity in dmPFC among young
adults revealed a trend toward increased activity among young
over older adults during encoding of veridical, but not false,
information regardless of the source. Albeit speculative, such an
interaction might be expected for this task because being told
that information is true might trigger allocation of attention for
prioritized encoding. Enhanced dmPFC activity in young over
older adults, especially for encoding true statements, may there-
fore reflect the overall knowledge acquisition focus among young
adults posited by Socioemotional Selectivity Theory (Carstensen
et al., 1999).
Older adults, in contrast, tend toward an enhanced focus on
salient and emotionally meaningful material (Fredrickson and
Carstensen, 1990; Carstensen and Turk-Charles, 1994; Fung et al.,
1999; Carstensen et al., 2000; Carstensen andMikels, 2005), which
we suggest may be reflected in their recruitment of vmPFC and
insula for subsequent memory relative to young adults. If older
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adults approach a task involving salient material with a focus,
conscious or not, on the personally relevant or emotional aspects
of the presented information, then we might expect increased
engagement of vmPFC (e.g., Mitchell et al., 2006a). Previous work
with young adults has shown that vmPFC is more active for tasks
involving more self-similar, and thereby potentially more person-
ally salient, information, vs. self-dissimilar social material, and
work in aging has also shown that age-related biases toward pos-
itively valenced social information might be primarily reflected
in vmPFC (Cassidy et al., 2013), rather than dmPFC activity.
Thus, a tendency to focus on salient socioemotional material
with age may result in more activation of neural regions sensitive
to emotional processing during tasks that involve the encoding
of value-rich material, such as truth value. Age-related increases
in vmPFC engagement may also reflect the idea that, with age,
enhanced focus on value-rich material may result in the recruit-
ment of brain regions supporting more affective vs. cognitive
processing.
Our findings are consistent with a growing body of work
showing that for young adults (Mitchell et al., 2004; Gilron and
Gutchess, 2012), and healthy older adults (Leshikar and Duarte,
2013), mPFC engagement may underlie subsequent memory for
value-rich information. This is in contrast to prior literature on
the encoding of non-social source material, which shows that age-
related impairments in encoding source information stem from
MTL dysfunction, particularly in the hippocampus (Mitchell
et al., 2000; Dennis et al., 2008). Notably, we did not find age
differences in hippocampal function for the task in the present
study. However, our results are consistent with a recent study
on source memory in aging that also utilized socially relevant
stimuli (Leshikar and Duarte, 2013), and with work suggest-
ing that face-trait associations are preserved in individuals with
substantial hippocampal damage (Todorov and Olson, 2008). A
critical follow-up to the present experiment would be to com-
pare directly, memory for socially salient with non-social source
information collected within the same task. Such a task could
provide evidence that different cortical networks may interact
with MTL memory systems for social vs. non-social information
across age.
Importantly, the demonstrated age differences in how young
and older adults recruit mPFC for encoding truth value may
reflect how such information was presented to them. Although
Pat and Chris were presented as sources of information, partici-
pants never learned additional behavioral information about Pat
and Chris aside from learning that one wasmore trustworthy than
the other. Speculatively, in aging, explicit person representations
and comparisons may drive dmPFC activity in socially salient
tasks. It could be that a lack of explicit person representation
involved in assessing abstract factual statements may explain why
young adults had enhanced dmPFC activity compared to older
adults for the encoding of truth value. Thus, we might expect
to see interactions with age in dmPFC activity for source mem-
ory related to people, but not for more abstract material. At the
same time, a focus on the emotional value of health information,
something that might have increased salience with age, may have
led to the demonstrated age difference in vmPFC activity seen
in the current task. These ideas could be further tested in future
work that directly compares neural responses to both abstract and
concrete social and non-social sources.
Also consistent with age differences in socioemotional orienta-
tion to the task, older adults had increased insula activity relative
to young adults. However, our exploratory analysis of parame-
ter estimates showed that enhanced activation of the right insula
was not characterized specifically by the truth value of infor-
mation or by the social source. Speculatively, enhanced insula
activity in older relative to young adults for subsequent mem-
ory for truth value may be indicative of more emotional initial
responses to incoming information (Critchley et al., 2004; Tsakiris
et al., 2007; Craig, 2009; Zaki et al., 2012) rather than treating
incoming material as facts that must be acquired for the pursuit
of knowledge.
Limitations of the present work include the sample sizes of the
young and older adult cohorts as well as the threshold for fMRI
analyses. Although exploring memory for truth value from the
lens of aging is an important topic with both social and pub-
lic health implications, the limited statistical power due to small
sample sizes restricted the present analyses from utilizing direct
contrasts of potential interactions (e.g., a direct contrast explor-
ing brain regions that might be differentially engaged with age
based on whether truth value was inferred or stated), and thus
the reported marginal interactions between conditions as well as
null results must be interpreted with caution. Although we inves-
tigated this in an exploratory way by characterizing our regions
of interest for potential differences in activity by truth value and
source type, we recognize that future work should test this in a
direct manner. Nonetheless, the marginal interactions we report
could be fruitful for the generation of future hypotheses, and
the reported effect sizes for these interactions suggest a poten-
tially significant effect if larger sample sizes were to be employed.
Moreover, the small sample sizes used here could have masked
potential age differences in our behavioral data, which in turn
could have guided analyses of the imaging data. Because other
studies found similar behavioral performance among young and
older adults for socioemotionally salient material (e.g., May et al.,
2005), it is unclear whether increasing our sample size would yield
age differences in memory, particularly as our means were quite
similar across the age groups.
Another potential limitation of the current work involved the
different age ranges of our young (5 year span) compared to older
(17 year span) adult samples. This could be problematic insofar
as it could have led to more age-related variance in the older vs.
young adults. This notable limitation is indicative of recruitment
difficulties in aging research, as fewer older adults volunteer for
fMRI studies than young. Moreover, the older adults who vol-
unteer for fMRI studies tend to be active and highly educated,
allowing for the possibility that more sedentary older adults may
show different patterns of brain activation. Incorporating a wider
range of ages in a lifespan sample could be helpful to address these
issues in future work.
Studying how young and older adults subsequently remem-
ber truth value and its underlying neural mechanism may help to
clarify a public health issue of critical importance. Older adults
have increased vulnerability to fraud compared to young adults
(Lormel, 2001; Telemarketing fraud against older Americans,
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2007; Ruffman et al., 2012). Deficits in source memory processes
may in part contribute to this enhanced vulnerability because in
order to successfully navigate through one’s environment, one
must not only consider and remember snippets of information,
but also where the information came from. That is, failing to
remember that a “fact” came from an unreliable source may lead
to suboptimal decision making. For instance, one may make a
bad financial investment after being given information from an
untrustworthy source, or may adopt a political opinion while
forgetting to consider that a biased source was reporting the infor-
mation in the first place. The observed age differences in mPFC
activity in response to encoding truth value may indicate that
approaching the learning of social source information with a
goal of acquiring knowledge could be a strategy more typical of
young adults that combats against fraud vulnerability, as opposed
to encoding incoming information in a more emotional way, a
strategy more typical of older adults.
In summary, the current work demonstrated that for the
salient task of encoding truth value of health statements, young
and older adults show differential recruitment of dmPFC and
vmPFC, despite showing similar behavioral performance. It
would be worthwhile for future work to test explicitly how age dif-
ferences in information processing styles may be associated with
age-related increases in vulnerability to fraud and deception.
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